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This dissertation examines the extent to which sentence interpretations are 
incrementally encoded in memory. While traditional models of sentence processing 
assume that comprehension results in a single interpretation, evidence from syntactic 
parsing indicates that initial misinterpretations are sometimes maintained in memory 
along with their revised counterparts (e.g., Christianson, Hollingworth, Halliwell & 
Ferreira, 2001). However, this evidence has largely come from experiments featuring 
sentences that are presented in isolation and words that are biased toward incorrect 
syntactic analyses. Because there is typically enough sentential context in natural 
speech to avoid the incorrect analysis (Roland, Elman, & Ferreira, 2006), it is unclear 
whether initial interpretations are incrementally encoded in memory when there is 
sufficient context. The scalar term “some” provides a test case where context is 
necessary to select between two interpretations, one based on semantics (some and 
possibly all) and one based on pragmatic inference (some but not all) (Horn, 1989). 
Although listeners strongly prefer the pragmatic interpretation (e.g., Van Tiel, Van 
  
Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts, 2016), prior research suggests that the semantic 
meaning is considered before the inference is adopted (Rips, 1975; Noveck & Posada, 
2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011). I used a word-learning and recall 
task to show that there is evidence of the semantic meaning in the memory 
representation of sentences featuring “some,” even when the pragmatic interpretation 
is ultimately adopted. This raises two possibilities: first, the memory representation 
was of poor quality because both interpretations were available during encoding, or 
the semantic meaning was computed and encoded first and lingered even after the 
pragmatic interpretation was computed and encoded. Data from a conflict-adaptation 
experiment revealed a facilitating effect of cognitive control engagement. However, 
there was still a delay before the pragmatic inference was adopted. This suggests that 
only the semantic meaning is available initially and the system failed to override it in 
memory when the pragmatic interpretation was computed. Taken together, these 
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“Time flies like the wind. Fruit flies like a banana.” This classic line attributed 
to comedian Groucho Marx exploits a fundamental characteristic of the language 
processing system: its incrementality. Rather than wait until the end of a sentence in 
(1), listeners generate hypotheses about what the speaker means as the sentence is 
unfolding. Groucho’s set-up biases listeners toward one interpretation of the sentence 
(2a) before the punchline forces a reinterpretation (2b). Humor is thought to arise 
when listeners contrast the old and new interpretations (Attardo & Raskin, 1991; 
Attardo, 1997; Nerlich & Clarke, 2001; Ritchie, 1999; Dynel, 2009ab).  
(1)  “Fruit flies like a banana.” 
 a. Initial interpretation: Fruit flies in a similar way to a banana 
b. Revised interpretation: Fruit flies enjoy eating bananas 
Recognizing this contrast would require a language processing system that builds and 
maintains both interpretations in memory, even after one is proven to be “correct.” 
While there is evidence from syntactic processing that readers sometimes maintain 
initial interpretations after reanalysis (Christianson, Hollingworth, Halliwell & 
Ferreira, 2001; Christianson, Williams, Zacks, & Ferreira, 2006; Ferreira, 
Christianson, & Hollingworth, 2001; Patson, Darowski, Moon, & Ferreira, 2009; 
Christianson, 2008; Slattery, Sturt, Christanson, Yoshida & Ferreira, 2013; Malyutina 





because they guide comprehenders toward the incorrect interpretation. For example, 
“drinks” is typically a transitive verb, leading readers to initially assume that “wine” 
is its object in “Because Bill drinks wine is never kept in the house” (Ferreira & 
Henderson, 1991). However, speakers are usually cooperative and provide as much 
information as is required to convey their meaning (Grice, 1975). Indeed, corpus 
analyses show that there is typically enough syntactic and semantic information from 
a garden-path sentence’s context to disambiguate its meaning (Roland, Elman, & 
Ferreira, 2006). Thus, it may be the case that incorrect interpretations only persist in 
the unique situations where word biases and a lack of context encourage 
comprehenders to misanalyse a sentence, like during linguistic experiments or joke-
telling. It may be that during typical language comprehension, when sufficient 
context is provided, only a single interpretation is maintained in memory. 
One way to test whether multiple interpretations are maintained when context 
is available is to examine a case where context is necessary to select one meaning of a 
word over another. For example, in sentences like (3), the semantic meaning of 
“some” is consistent with any quantity greater than none (4a). However, a listener 
could infer that because the speaker did not use the stronger term “all,” it must not 
apply in this context (4b) (Horn, 1972, 1989; Gadzar, 1979). Although listeners 
strongly prefer the pragmatic meaning of “some” (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; Geurts & Pouscoulous, 2009; Van Tiel, Van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, 
& Geurts, 2016), prior research suggests that its semantic meaning is considered 





2004; Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Huang & 
Snedeker, 2009, 2011).  
(3) “The girl ate some of the cookies” 
(4)  a. Semantic: The girl ate some and possibly all of the cookies 
b. Pragmatic: The girl ate some but not all of the cookies 
Thus, at the point at which comprehenders accept the pragmatic inference they have 
entertained both the semantic and pragmatic meanings of “some.” Is the semantic 
meaning included in the interpretation that is carried forward in memory? Or is it 
replaced by the pragmatic inference? One possibility is that during real-time 
comprehension, meaning is encoded in memory after a final interpretation is reached. 
If this is the case, then there should be minimal traces of the semantic meaning when 
the pragmatic inference overrides initial semantic analysis. Another possibility is that 
during comprehension, meaning is incrementally encoded in memory, even before a 
final interpretation is reached. If this is the case, then the semantic meaning may 
persist in memory and possibly emerge in later recall.  
In the remainder of this Introduction, I first discuss seemingly conflicting 
evidence about the generation of multiple interpretations during word recognition and 
syntactic parsing. On the one hand, interpretations based on initial misanalyses are 
sometimes encoded in memory along with their updated counterparts. However, other 
data suggest that context is quickly used to select a single interpretation to be encoded 
in memory. Next, I discuss past accounts and how they characterize processing when 





existing data that includes predictions about pragmatic inferencing. Finally, I provide 
an outline of the dissertation.  
 
1.2 Interpretation building in word recognition and syntactic parsing 
Evidence of the incrementality of interpretation building has come from word 
recognition and syntactic parsing. For example, phono-semantic priming suggests that 
hearing the start of a word activates multiple lexical representations. When presented 
with “Pick up the beaker,” listeners were more likely to initially fixate on a 
phonological competitor (e.g., a beetle) than an object with a phonologically 
unrelated name (e.g., a carriage). This suggests that all phonologically consistent 
lexical representations are triggered as a word unfolds (Allopenna, Magnuson, & 
Tanenhaus, 1998). Moreover, at the point of word onset (e.g., “Point to the lo-”), 
listeners look to depictions of the semantic relations of phonologically related words 
(e.g., looks to KEY which is related to “lock”) (Yee & Sedivy, 2006). This suggests 
that the meanings, not just the form, of words that fit the phonological context (e.g., 
“lock”) and words that could not possibly be the target (e.g., “key”) are incrementally 
activated as the word unfolds.  
Evidence from syntactic processing suggests that the activation of multiple 
syntactic representations can lead to the generation of multiple interpretations. A 
series of studies by Ferreira and colleagues have demonstrated that readers often 





al., 2001; Christianson et al., 2006; Ferreira et al., 2001; Patson et al., 2009; 
Christianson, 2008; Slattery et al., 2013; Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016). For 
example, after reading temporarily ambiguous sentences like “While Bill hunted the 
deer that was brown and graceful ran into the woods,” participants incorrectly 
answered, “yes” to “Did Bill hunt the deer?” 56% of the time. Critically, they 
correctly answered, “yes” to “Did the deer run into the woods?” 91% of the time, 
bringing the total percentage of “yes” answers to the two questions to well over 100% 
(Christianson et al., 2001). This suggests that, initially, “the deer” was interpreted as 
the thing being hunted, and this misanalysis persisted even when the correct 
interpretation was adopted, leading to the encoding of both interpretations in memory. 
Also, when presented with three pictures and asked to select the one that matched the 
sentence “While the man hunted the deer ran into the woods,” listeners correctly 
identified the depiction consistent with a reanalyzed interpretation (e.g., a man 
hunting a bird and a deer running into the woods) 84% of the time. Notably, 69% of 
incorrect responses were based on a “blended interpretation” between the initial and 
revised analyses (e.g., a man hunting a deer as the deer runs into the woods) 
(Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016). These results suggest that the initial and revised 
interpretations both persisted in the memory of the utterance. This may occur when 
there is prolonged uncertainty about which syntactic analysis is correct. Worse 
performance on comprehension questions about sentences that trigger uncertainty 
(e.g. “The coach smiled at the player tossed the Frisbee”) versus sentences that do not 





can be maintained throughout the sentence (Levy, Bicknell, Slattery, & Rayner, 
2009). This further suggests that multiple interpretations can be built and maintained 
in memory, one for each of the competing syntactic analyses. 
 However, prior studies have also shown that context can be used to rapidly 
constrain the set of interpretations under consideration, which may allow the system 
to avoid generating multiple interpretations altogether. For example, evidence from 
word recognition studies suggests that listeners often activate only contextually 
consistent lexical representations, rather than all phonologically possible forms 
(Becker, 1980; Goldinger, Luce, & Pisoni, 1989; Magnuson, Dixon, Tanenhaus, & 
Aslin, 2007; Swinney, 1979). For example, when presented with a constraining 
context like “Never before climbed a go-…” Dutch-speaking listeners looked to the 
contextually appropriate picture of a goat (“bok”) and not to a word that shared the 
same onset, e.g., “bot” (bone) (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2004).  
In syntactic processing, visual context is often used to activate only 
contextually appropriate representations (Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Altmann & Kamide, 
1999; Kamide, Scheepers, & Altmann, 2003; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003; 
Chambers, Tanenhaus, & Magnuson, 2004; Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 
2002). For example, when listeners heard “Put the apple on the towel into the box” 
while viewing a display of an apple on a towel and a pencil, their eye movements to 
an empty towel suggested that they initially interpreted “on the towel” as indicating a 





apple, participants immediately interpreted the phrase as a modifier and looked to the 
box before hearing “on the box” (Tanenhaus et al., 1995).  
Context can be so constraining that listeners are able to predict upcoming 
linguistic material. For example, when presented with sentences like “The boy will 
eat the…” while looking at a display of a boy, a cake, and several non-edible items, 
listeners looked to the cake before the start of the word “cake.” This suggests that 
listeners used the semantics of the verb “eat” to predict the upcoming noun. Also, 
when presented with mini-stories like “The burglar had no trouble finding the family 
safe. Of course, it was situated behind a…” Dutch readers spent a longer time reading 
adjectives (e.g., big) that did not match the syntactic gender of the noun predicted by 
the discourse (e.g., painting) (vanBerkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & 
Hagoort, 2005). This suggests that readers were anticipating the upcoming noun and 
experienced processing difficulty when the adjective did not match the noun they 
predicted. These findings provide empirical support for the view that the language 
processing system uses contextual information to quickly resolve competition 
between lower-level representations and selects a single representation for 
interpretation. 
In sum, part of the empirical evidence suggests that initial interpretations can 
be built and encoded in memory before a final interpretation is reached (Christianson 
et al., 2001; Christianson et al., 2006; Ferreira et al., 2001; Patson et al., 2009; 
Christianson, 2008; Slattery et al., 2013; Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016). However, 





context and generates interpretations only after the competition between 
phonological, lexical, and syntactic representations has been resolved (Frazier & 
Fodor, 1978; MacDonald et al., 1994; Trueswell et al., 1993). In the following 
section, I will describe how these accounts deal with situations in which multiple 
representations are consistent with the linguistic input. This can give us a hint as to 
when the models would predict an interpretation is encoded in memory. Must 
competition between representations be resolved before the system moves on to new 
linguistic input or can multiple representations continue in the interpretive process?  
 
1.3 Models of sentence processing that predict single interpretations 
While past accounts of sentence processing were developed with different 
goals in mind, these models can make predictions as to when the final interpretation 
of a sentence is encoded in memory. Classic models of parsing like two-stage (Frazier 
& Fodor, 1978; Frazier, 1979; Clifton & Frazier, 1989) and constraint-based models 
(MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Spivey-Knowlton & Sedivy, 1995; 
Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Kello, 1993; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & 
Sedivy, 1995) were designed to explain how the processing system deals with 
temporary syntactic ambiguities. Baysian approaches like surprisal theory and noisy-
channel models describe how a system deals with errors in the language input, either 
due to a noisy environment, speaker errors, or perceiver errors (Hale, 2001; Levy, 





model challenges the assumption that the principal aim of the language 
comprehension system is to derive a complete, accurate, and detailed representation 
of the speaker’s utterance (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Ferreira et al., 2001; 
Ferreira & Patson, 2007).  
One example where the linguistic input is consistent with two different 
representations is in the case of temporary syntactic ambiguity. For example, in (5), 
the word “raced” is temporarily ambiguous: prior to the word “fell” a comprehender 
may treat “raced” as a past tense verb, rather than the past participle introducing a 
reduced relative clause.  
(5) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
According to two-stage models, the system computes syntactic analyses in two stages 
(Frazier & Fodor, 1978; Frazier, 1979; Clifton & Frazier, 1989). This is depicted in 
the diagram in Figure 1. In the first stage, an initial analysis is built using only 
syntactic information. Because this first stage parser has limited working memory 
capacity, it cannot access what comes later in sentence, beyond the phrase it is 
currently analyzing. Moreover, the system favors analyses which cost the least 
amount of effort. Thus, for the sentence in (5), the first stage parser would encounter 
“raced” and treat it as a past tense verb since a simple declarative sentence is a less 
complicated structure than a reduced relative clause. In the second stage, other 
sources of information can be used, like semantic or contextual information. The 
second stage parser also has unlimited working memory capacity and it combines 





attempt to reconcile the word “fell” with the rest of the sentence. Critically, only one 
structure is considered at a time. Thus, reanalyzing the word “raced” in the second 
stage would completely replace its syntactic representation as a past tense verb with a 
representation as a past participle. This suggests that, within a two-stage model, an 
initially incorrect parse that was built in the first stage is lost after it is shunted to the 









Figure 1. Two-stage model of sentence processing. In (a), based on the speech 
segment "The horse raced past the barn...,” the processing system has completed 
speech sound segmentation, word retrieval, and analyzed the word "raced" as a 
transitive verb. In (b), the system has encountered the verb "fell,” triggering a re-
analysis of "raced" as a past participle. The initial syntactic analysis is completely 
discarded and a final interpretation is reached. 
 
In contrast, constraint-based systems consider multiple syntactic structures in 
parallel, but only interpret the one that has the most contextual support (MacDonald 
et al., 1994; Spivey-Knowlton & Sedivy, 1995; Trueswell et al., 1993; Tanenhaus et 
al., 1995). This is depicted in the diagram in Figure 2. Unlike earlier views that 
assumed syntactic processing involved constructing one structure at a time, 





activated. The degree of activation depends on the amount of evidence in favor of a 
particular structure. This evidence can come from any informational source, including 
prior sentence context and extra-linguistic knowledge like the visual scene, as soon as 
it is available. Disambiguation occurs when one structure is selected and the system 
inhibits all alternatives. Importantly, constraint-based models assume that 
disambiguation must be achieved at all levels of representation. Thus, the system 
quickly rules out context-incompatible structures and any initially incorrect 
hypotheses are actively inhibited by the selection of an alternative. This suggests that, 
within the constraint-based system, only a single representation is encoded in 








Figure 2. Constraint-based model of sentence processing. In (a), based on the 
speech segment "The horse raced past the barn...,” the processing system has 
completed speech sound segmentation, word retrieval, and "raced" has been analyzed 
as a transitive verb and as a past participle. In (b), the system has encountered the 
verb "fell,” eliminating the representation of "raced" as a past participle. The incorrect 
syntactic analysis is completely discarded and a final interpretation is reached. 
 
1.4 Models of sentence processing that predict multiple interpretations 
Both the two-stage and constraint-based accounts of language processing 
predict that an interpretation is encoded in memory after competition between 
representations has been resolved or an initial misanalysis has been revised. This 
results in a single interpretation of the sentence in question. In contrast, more recent 





persist in memory. In particular, the Good Enough model developed by Ferreira and 
colleagues grew out of the observation that sentence comprehension does not always 
result in a single, detailed representation of a sentence. Instead, The Good Enough 
model assumes that the goal of comprehension is to quickly build a sensible meaning 
for linguistic input, not necessarily a completely accurate representation (Ferreira et 
al., 2001; Ferreira et al., 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). This means that sentences 
are often incorrectly interpreted or incompletely revised. When this happens, 
misinterpretations can persist in memory even when there is evidence that a new, 
revised interpretation was generated. Support for this assumption comes from 
evidence that the interpretation based on an incorrect syntactic analysis is maintained 
in memory even after the sentence is reanalyzed and a new interpretation is made 
(Christianson et al., 2001; Christianson et al., 2006; Ferreira, 2003; Ferreira et al., 
2001; Slattery et al., 2013). This can lead to a final interpretation that is only partially 
reanalyzed and not necessarily consistent with the linguistic input. However, this 
theory claims that interpretations “persist in memory” but is not specific about what 
type of memory is involved (e.g., working memory or long-term memory). 
The possibility of the system activating and maintaining multiple interpretations is 
also alluded to by noisy-channel models. Noisy-channel models have proposed a 
highly rational system that simultaneously infers likely sentences based on speakers’ 
intended meaning (Levy, 2008; Levy et al., 2009; Gibson et al., 2013). Within this 
system, the final interpretation is not completely determined by a sentence’s syntax. 





ambiguity, semantic and contextual information are used to generate expectations 
about likely sentences throughout the interpretation process. Notably, within these 
rational models, the processor maintains uncertainty about word identities and 
constantly reassesses based on grammatical information from subsequent input. This 
suggests that, under conditions of uncertainty, multiple word meanings can be 
maintained, at least until later in the sentence (Levy et al., 2009). However, the noisy-
channel model does not explicitly claim that full sentence interpretations are built and 
maintained in memory, or predict how long multiple word meanings can persist. 
Again, these prior accounts of sentence processing do not explicitly describe what 
information is carried forward in memory. 
 
1.5 A model of memory encoding during interpretation building  
A model that specifically addresses when the language processing system 
encodes an interpretation in memory can be developed with these prior accounts in 
mind. One such account is depicted in the diagram in Figure 3. The defining feature 
of this model is that multiple interpretations can be incrementally committed to 
memory as a sentence is processed. One way this may be accomplished is through 
memory consolidation similar to the “Chunk-and-Pass” system described by 
Christiansen and Chater (2016). Incoming linguistic material is recoded into chunks 
and passed to progressively higher levels of linguistic representation (e.g., lexical, 





example, the lexical item “raced” in Figure 3 may be recoded with the previous item 
“the horse” at the syntactic level as both a transitive structure and a reduced relative 
clause. Unlike the Chunk-and-Pass framework in Christiansen and Chater (2016), the 
present model allows these competing lower-level codes to be recoded into higher-
level chunks that are activated in parallel. At the highest levels, chunks are integrated 
with pragmatic context to form discourse-level structures. The “Final Interpretation” 
box in Figure 3 signifies the output(s) of this integration.  
Prior work in syntactic processing suggests that multiple interpretations can 
persist in memory long enough to interfere with recall well after a sentence has 
completed (e.g., when answering comprehension questions). This suggests that 
interpretations are maintained in memory longer than a limited capacity system like 
working memory would allow. Thus, while the chunking process occurs in a limited 
capacity system, final interpretations are ultimately committed to a longer-term 
memory store. Within a classic model of memory (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) this 
would require a transfer from working memory to long-term memory. However, more 
recent theories of memory in language comprehension draw a distinction between 
limited capacity buffers that retrieve representations from declarative memory, which 
can include short- and long-term memory (e.g., Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). These 
representations are bundles of features (e.g. singular noun) that have assigned 
activation values based on prior usage and decay over time. Chapter 5, Section 2 
describes how multiple interpretations may persist in an activation-based memory 





for the existence of multiple interpretations in memory and not distinguish between 
these memory architectures. So, to simplify terminology for the question at hand, an 
interpretation will be called “encoded” when it is out of working memory/the focus of 
attention and in long-term/short-term/declarative memory. In the case of scalar 
inferences, this model of processing proposes that two interpretations of the word 
“some” will persist in memory. When “some” is encountered, the semantic meaning 
is retrieved and integrated into an interpretation which is then encoded in memory. 









Figure 3. An alternative account. In (a), based on the speech segment "The horse 
raced past the barn...,” the processing system has completed speech sound 
segmentation, word retrieval, and "raced" has been analyzed as a transitive verb and 





In (c), the system has encountered the verb "fell,” eliminating the syntactic 
representation of "raced" as a past participle. However, both interpretations persist in 
memory. 
 
In order to test this account, it is necessary to incorporate two characteristics 
that have been lacking from prior studies that examined persisting interpretations in 
memory. First, the evidence to date has largely focused on syntactic parsing, which 
relies on representations that are internal to linguistic processing. In these cases, 
competition between syntactic representations is ultimately resolved by linguistic 
disambiguation (e.g., hearing “…ran into the woods” after “While Bill hunted the 
deer…” tells you that Bill did not hunt the deer). Knowing that a sentence will 
ultimately be disambiguated may decrease a comprehender’s motivation to 
immediately select a single interpretation. Critically, comprehension also involves 
higher-level analyses like pragmatic inferencing, which operate over meaning-based 
representations and offer no linguistic disambiguation.  
Second, the evidence that multiple interpretations are formed comes from 
cases where limited context is available to select a single representation. Unlike 
naturalistic speech, garden-path sentences in studies probing for persisting memory 
interpretations are typically presented in isolation (Christianson et al., 2001; 
Christianson et al., 2006; Ferreira et al., 2001; Patson et al., 2009; Slattery et al., 
2013; Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016; cf. Christianson, 2008). However, corpus 





correct interpretation of an ambiguous verb (Roland et al., 2006). Thus, the activation 
of an initially incorrect syntactic analysis may be avoided by a strongly constraining 
context, leading to only a single interpretation in memory.  
The use of scalar inferences addresses both of these concerns. First, there is no 
linguistic cue to disambiguate the final interpretation. For example, sentences like (6) 
are globally ambiguous between the semantic meaning in (7a) and the pragmatic 
meaning in (7b). Second, a rich context is necessary to generate the inference. If the 
language processing system typically relies on context to override or avoid initially 
incorrect interpretations, the semantic meaning of "some" should not persist in 
memory. 
(6) “The girl ate some of the cookies” 
(7)  a. Semantic: The girl ate some and possibly all of the cookies 
b. Pragmatic: The girl ate some but not all of the cookies 
1.6 Outline of dissertation 
This dissertation features three experiments that explore the time-course and 
mechanisms supporting the encoding of a sentence’s interpretation (or interpretations) 
in memory. The goal of Chapter 2 is to examine the extent to which initial 
interpretations are encoded in memory. Specifically, it asks whether the semantic 
meaning of “some” is maintained in memory following a pragmatic inference. To 
answer this question, I used a task in which participants must generate a pragmatic 





novel word. Later, participants were asked to recall the novel word. If it is the case 
that the semantic meaning of “some” is interpreted and maintained in memory, then 
participants may recall the wrong novel object. Thus, recall of the novel words that 
were learned by pragmatic inference should be lower than recall for words learned by 
exact semantics. However, if the pragmatic inference overrides the semantic meaning 
of “some” and only one interpretation is encoded in memory, recall for the novel 
words should be similar regardless of which quantifier was featured during word 
learning. 
The goal of Chapter 3 is to investigate the possible role that visual attention 
plays in the paradigm used in Chapter 2. Specifically, it asks whether there is still 
memory interference when “some” is used but no pragmatic inference is made. To 
answer this question, “some” was presented in a downward-entailing context, which 
blocks the pragmatic inference. Cues were used to ensure that the same amount of 
time was spent inspecting the novel objects as in Experiment 1. If simply attending to 
the objects during the word-learning task is enough to encode their visual 
representation in memory, then recall of the novel words learned using “some” should 
be lower than recall of words learned using other quantifiers. However, if attention to 
the objects does not encode them in memory then recall should be similar across all 
quantifiers. 
The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 raise two possibilities: first, the 
memory representation may have been of poor quality because both interpretations 





first and lingered even after the pragmatic interpretation was computed and encoded. 
Chapter 4 explores the extent to which both semantic and pragmatic interpretations 
are available prior to the adoption of the pragmatic inference. Experiment 3 tests for 
the presence of competition between interpretations prior to the generation of a 
pragmatic inference by engaging cognitive control, the mechanism responsible for 
selecting between competing representations. Prior work on cognitive control has 
shown that engagement of this mechanism occurs when multiple syntactic 
representations are in conflict (Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005, 2010; 
January, Thompson-Schill, Trueswell, 2009; Ye & Zhou, 2009; Hsu & Novick, 
2016). If accessing the word “some” activates both the semantic and pragmatic 
meanings of the word, there should be evidence of competition prior to the adoption 
of the pragmatic inference. However, if semantic analysis precedes the inference and 
only one interpretation is available prior to the pragmatic inference, then there should 
be no evidence of competition during this time. 
In the final chapter, I compare the findings of the experiments included in this 
dissertation. I discuss the results within the context of current work on scalar 
inferences. Finally, I examine the broader implications of this research for current 







In this chapter, I report the first of three experiments that investigate the 
nature of sentence interpretation encoding using scalar inferences. Scalar inferences 
are used to see whether multiple interpretations persist in memory even when there is 
contextual support for one over the other. First, I discuss where scalar inferences lie 
on either side of Grice’s distinction between Generalized and Particularized 
Conversational Implicatures (Grice, 1975). Then I summarize contrasting theories of 
how scalar inferences are calculated in real-time and discuss prior work investigating 
scalar inference processing (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny 
et al., 2006; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011, in press; 
Grodner, Klein, Carbary & Tanenhaus, 2010; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). In 
addition, I describe an experimental paradigm that provides an unbiased measure of 
memory recall. Finally, I describe an experiment that uses the unbiased memory 
paradigm to study scalar inferences. 
 
2.2 Scalar inferences 
Listeners must often infer an intended meaning that goes beyond what a 
speaker explicitly states. Often, the inferred meaning is triggered by context. Grice 





of the context and those that arise unless they are blocked by context. Take, for 
example, the question and answer in (8): 
(8)  Speaker A: Did Alix submit her dissertation? 
 Speaker B: She wrote some of the chapters. 
a. Alix did not submit her dissertation 
 b. Alix did not write all of the chapters 
One inference that could be drawn from this short dialogue is that Alix has not 
yet submitted her dissertation. Grice called this type of inference a Particularized 
Conversational Implicature because it relies heavily on the context and the question 
under discussion. For example, if the response in (8) had been to the question of 
whether Alix wrote Chapter 2, the inference that she did not submit her dissertation 
would not have arisen. A second inference that could be drawn from this dialogue is 
that Alix did not write all of the chapters. Grice characterized this type of inference as 
a Generalized Conversational Implicature, which is thought to arise relatively 
independently of the context. The inference in (8b) is an example of a scalar 
inference. 
A scalar inference arises when the use of an informationally weaker term like 
“some” is inferred to mean the negation of an informationally stronger term like “all.” 
Instead of the response in (8) the second speaker could have said “Alix wrote all of 
the chapters,” which would have been more informative. “All” is an informationally 
stronger scalar term than “some” because “some” can be used in any situation where 





listener assumes that the speaker is a cooperative interlocutor by being as informative 
as possible (the Competence Assumption, Sauerland, 2004; van Rooij & Schulz, 
2004), the listener infers that Alix wrote some but not all of the chapters (8b). The 
pragmatic interpretation of “some” is sometimes referred to as an “upper-bounded” 
reading because it excludes referents compatible with the stronger term (all). In 
contrast, the semantic meaning of “some” has a “lower-bounded” reading that 
includes the stronger term.  
 
2.3 Accounts of scalar inference processing 
There are opposing accounts of how and when comprehenders compute scalar 
inferences as an utterance unfolds. One set of accounts describe inferences as 
immediate, either because the pragmatic interpretation is the default interpretation 
(Levinson, 2000; Chierchia, 2004), or because the inference is rapidly calculated 
based on current experience (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). 
Other accounts assume that computing the scalar inference takes time and requires 
initial access to the semantic meaning (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011, in press).  
Early work on this subject supports the latter account, based on response times 
during sentence judgment tasks (Rips, 1975; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & 
Noveck, 2004; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007). For example, when presented with 
under-informative statements like “Some elephants are mammals,” readers were 





pragmatic meaning of “some”) compared to “True” (consistent with the semantic 
meaning of “some”) (Bott & Noveck, 2004). Longer response times for “False” 
statements suggest that computing the scalar inference takes more processing time 
than accessing the semantic meaning of “some.” Eye-tracking studies suggest that this 
extra processing time is required to access the semantic meaning before the pragmatic 
inference (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011, in press). Huang and Snedeker (2009) 
presented listeners with sentences like “Point to the girl that has all/some of the 
socks/soccer balls,” while their eye-movements were measured to a total-set of soccer 
balls and a subset of socks. After the onset of “all,” listeners quickly looked to the 
total-set. However, after the onset of “some,” they were equally likely to look at the 
subset and total-set. These findings support a theory of scalar inference processing 
where the semantic meaning of “some” is retrieved before the inference is adopted. 
In contrast, Default accounts of scalar inferencing assume that scalar 
inferences are computed automatically by a default mechanism (Levinson, 2000) or 
generated by semantic rules (Chierchia, 2004). According to Levinson (2000), the 
pragmatic meaning of “some” is stored in the lexicon and can be immediately and 
effortlessly accessed. Evidence that the pragmatic inference is generated rapidly has 
come from visual world experiments (Grodner et al., 2010; Breheny, Ferguson, & 
Katsos, 2013; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). For example, Grodner et al. (2010) 
presented listeners with sentences like “Click on the girl who has summa the balls” 
while their eye movements were measured to a total-set of balloons and a subset of 





“some” and avoided a competitor compatible with the semantic meaning of “some” 
following the onset of “summa.” Critically, looks to the target were as fast for 
“summa” as for the quantifiers “nunna” and “alla.” This suggests that the scalar 
inference was automatically triggered when participants encountered “summa.”  
Evidence for the Default model also comes from a text comprehension 
experiment featuring number terms by Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002). Many 
linguists have suggested that numbers have lower-bounded semantics (“two” means 
at least two) and upper-bounded interpretations (“two” means exactly two) arise 
through scalar inferences (Horn, 1972, 1989; Gadzar, 1979; Levinson, 2000). In 
Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002), number terms were presented either upper- or 
lower-bound contexts, and the time taken to read the terms was longer in the lower-
bound context. This suggests that the pragmatic inference was made by default and 
cancelling this inference took extra processing time.  
Degen and Tanenhaus (2015) discuss a constraint-based account of scalar 
inferencing that tries to account for the contradicting evidence from visual world 
paradigms. In this account, the more probabilistic support from cues in the sentence 
means it is more likely that the inference will be made. If there is less support, 
listeners will take longer to arrive at the inference (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). They 
argue that the inference was delayed in Huang and Snedeker’s experiment because 
number terms were included in their stimuli. Number terms are more natural labels 
for set sizes (Grodner et al., 2010; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; cf. Huang & Snedeker, 





processing. Experimental support for this theory comes from evidence that the use of 
“some” is less natural for some set sizes than others. For example, when presented 
with a gumball machine with an upper and lower chamber, listeners were less likely 
to generate the scalar inference when the number of gumballs in the lower chamber 
was a small set (1-3 of 13 gumballs) compared to an intermediate set (6-8 gumballs). 
The Default account would not predict any difference in naturalness for different set 
sizes. 
Further support for a context-based account comes from Breheny and 
colleagues, who replicated the text comprehension experiment by Bezuidenhout and 
Cutting (2002) using the conjunction “or.” A statement like “Mary dated John or Bill” 
is true even if Mary dated John and Bill, but the implication is that Mary did not date 
both. Contrary to Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002), Breheny and colleagues found 
that reading times of the region including “or” were longer in contexts that supported 
the inference versus contexts that supported the literal interpretation. Longer reading 
times at this point suggest that the inference was only drawn in the inference-
supporting context. They concluded that scalar inferences are not generated by 
default, but only when the context warrants them. Bergen and Grodner (2012) came 
to a similar conclusion when they tested the impact of speaker knowledge on 
inference computation. Regions of sentences including “some” were read more 
slowly when a preceding context established that the speaker was likely to know 
whether the stronger alternative (“all”) was true versus when it was only possible that 





when the reader thought the speaker was fully knowledgeable, further supporting the 
theory that scalar inferences are context-dependent.   
2.4 An unbiased measure of memory recall 
Importantly, prior work leaves open the question of whether the semantic 
meaning of “some” is encoded in memory before a pragmatic inference is made. One 
challenge to investigating what is encoded in memory is that the tasks commonly 
used to probe interpretations may themselves introduce bias for meanings. Recall that 
responses to verification questions and picture-matching tasks suggest that 
interpretations based on initial and revised syntactic analyses are maintained in 
memory (Christianson et al., 2001; Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016). However, it 
remains unclear whether readers encoded both interpretations in memory, or whether 
the presence of verification questions and pictures themselves generate a bias to recall 
a misinterpretation. For example, asking a comprehension question may re-activate 
the interpretation that the question is about, even if it had been successfully revised 
(Tabor, Galantucci, & Richardson, 2004).  
 In contrast, Experiment 1 indirectly probes interpretation and memory by 
using a word-learning and recall task. Words link sound to meaning: when sounds are 
perceived, they activate corresponding meanings in memory. These sound-to-
meaning mappings can be learned by using cues within sentences (Gillette, Gleitman, 
Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999; Gleitman, 1990; Naigles, 1990; Gleitman, Cassidy, 





useful for our present purposes because listeners could learn a novel word by 
generating an interpretation based on a scalar inference. Then, this interpretation can 
be probed by asking the listeners to recall that novel word.  
In recent work on syntactic parsing, Huang and Arnold (2016) examined how 
children’s learning and memory of novel-word meanings varied with the need to 
revise. During each trial of a word-learning task, adults and 5-year-olds heard a novel 
word as the first or second noun embedded in a passive sentence (e.g. “The 
blicket/seal will be eaten by the seal/blicket”) or active sentence (e.g., “The 
blicket/seal ate the seal/blicket”), and were asked to select the object that 
corresponded to that noun. Following the word-learning task, participants were asked 
again for the referent of the novel word (e.g., “Which one is the blicket?”). During the 
word-learning task when the novel word was first in the sentence, eye movements 
suggest that both adults and children initially considered an interpretation where the 
novel word was the agent of the action. After encountering the passive marker (“-en 
by”), this interpretation was revised. When syntactic revision was required, both 
adults and children took longer to disambiguate the sentence. Importantly, even when 
children correctly mapped word meanings during the word-learning task (e.g., 
selected “blicket” to refer to the thing eaten), they often misremembered the meaning 
during the recall task (e.g., choosing the eater). This suggests that, during recall, 
initially incorrect interpretations interfered with the retrieval of the novel word 
meanings. Moreover, adults who incorrectly responded to the word-learning task sill 





the sentences were partially revised and the correct syntactic representation persisted 
in memory to be accessed at recall. These findings demonstrate that the word-learning 
and recall task can be used to probe participants’ memory for the presence of multiple 
interpretations. 
Experiment 1 extends this task to scalar inferences in adults. During the word-
learning task, participants were given instructions like “Click on the girl that has 
some/all/two/three of the blickets” while their eye-movements were recorded to a 
display depicting novel objects divided among characters (Figure 4). Similar to 
Huang and Snedeker (2009), one critical character had a subset of objects (subset), 
and a gender-matched character had a total-set of objects (total-set). Thus, both girls 
are consistent with the semantic meaning of “some” but only the subset is consistent 
with the pragmatic meaning of “some.” Based on prior research (Huang & Snedeker, 
2009, 2011, in press), fixations following the onset of "some" are expected to be split 
between the subset and total-set. Moreover, based on prior research (Rips 1975; 
Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Breheny et al., 2006; De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011), participants should make the scalar 






Figure 4. Sample display from the word-learning task. The girl in upper-right 
quadrant has a subset of one object and the girl in the lower-right quadrant has all 
of a second object. 
 
Figure 5. Sample display from the recall task. The subset object is on the left and 






 Nevertheless, it remains unknown the extent to which the semantic meaning is 
encoded in memory before the pragmatic inference is made. To address this, 
participants were also presented with a separate recall task, after the completion of the 
word-learning task. In the recall task, they were presented with the same novel items 
and were asked to, “Click on the blicket” (Figure 5). If listeners generate an 
interpretation of the utterance using the semantic meaning of “some”, the novel word 
could be mapped to either the subset or total-set object. However, if listeners generate 
an interpretation of the utterance using the pragmatic meaning of “some”, the novel 
word would be mapped exclusively to the subset object. Assessing the degree to 
which object selection in the word-learning task matches object selection in the recall 
task can test whether semantic meaning persists in memory even after a pragmatic 
inference in generated. If memory encoding relies on the resolution of competition at 
lower levels of analysis, then only the interpretation based on the pragmatic meaning 
of “some” will be encoded during word-learning trials, leading to a high recall rate. 
However, if representations are encoded incrementally, interpretations based on the 
pragmatic as well as semantic meanings will be encoded in memory, leading to 






2.5 Experiment 1 
2.5.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Maryland were recruited 
for this study. They received either $5 or course credit for their participation. All 
participants were native English speakers. 
2.5.2 Procedures 
The study involved two tasks, presented in fixed order. Participants completed 
a word-learning task followed by a recall task. 
Word-learning task. Participants sat in front of a computer monitor, and their 
eye-movements were measured to the display using an Eyelink 1000 desktop eye-
tracker (SR Research). Prior to the experiment, participants were told that they would 
see a display of four children with strange objects, and they should pay attention to 
these objects’ names. Each trial featured two phases. During the familiarization 
phase, participants were presented with a display of four children. Objects appeared 
next to the boy and girl in top two quadrants, followed by the boy and girl in the 
bottom two quadrants. In the test phase, participants heard the critical instructions to 
click on one of the children, as in (9). When the participant did this, the trial ended 
and the next trial began. 
(9) “Click on the girl that has some/two/all/three of the blickets.” 
Recall task. After completing 16 trials in the word-learning task, the recall 





word-learning task and asked to select the object corresponding to the novel word 
(e.g., “Click on the blicket”). Once the participant did this, the trial ended and new 
novel objects were displayed. Participants were asked to recall all 16 of the novel 
words. 
2.5.3 Materials 
Word-learning task. Across all trials, the four children appeared on the 
display in the same configuration. The vertically adjacent children matched in gender 
while the horizontally adjacent children did not. A set of four novel objects (subset 
object) were split between a horizontally adjacent boy and girl and a set of three 
novel objects (total-set object) were given to one of the remaining children. This 
ensured that among the critical characters, one had a subset and the other had a total-
set. 
The instructions featured four quantifiers that constitute four conditions 
varying along two factors. In addition to "some," the scalar term "all" was included to 
establish a baseline for the time it takes to show a preference for the Target when the 
subset object is not consistent with the semantic meaning of the quantifier. In addition 
to the scalar terms, two terms from the number scale ("two" and "three") were 
included to ensure that differences between scalar trials was not due to preference to 
look at larger quantities. Like "all,” number terms do not require an inference to 
specify quantities. Importantly, the meaning of “two” rules out the same competitor 





there is a temporal difference between reference restriction via semantic meaning and 
reference restriction via pragmatic inference. The first factor, quantifier type, 
contrasts terms from the Gricean scale (“some” and “all”) with terms from the 
number scale (“two” and “three”). The second factor, quantifier strength, contrasts 
weaker quantifiers (“some” and “two”) with stronger ones (“all” and “three”). These 
four terms were paired with four target instructions, as in (9). 
The target instructions within each condition were identical except for the 
gender of the target child and the novel word. The gender of the requested child was 
linked to the display (e.g., if the set of three objects is given to a girl, then a girl was 
requested). The requested child was labeled as the Target and their gender-matched 
counterpart was the Distractor. Thus, in the “some/two” trials, the Target was the 
subset character and the Distractor was the total-set character. In the “all/three” trials, 
the Target was the total-set character and the Distractor was the subset character. 
Across 16 trials, there were 32 novel objects: 16 presented as part of a subset and 16 
presented as part of a total-set. Four versions of each instruction were used to create 
four presentation lists such that each list contained four instructions in each condition. 
Each pair of objects appeared just once in each list for a total of 16 items per list. 
These word-learning trials were randomly displayed. 
 Recall task. The recall task featured 16 trials. Within each trial, a display 
depicted a pair of novel objects from a trial in the word-learning task, arranged side-






Eye-movements were examined to determine whether there were online 
processing differences between the four quantifier conditions. Based on prior 
research, preference for the Target referent was expected to occur later in the "some" 
trials compared to "all,” "two,” and "three" trials (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011, in 
press). The proportion of fixations to the Target was calculated for two regions over 
the duration of the quantifier and up to the onset of the novel word: 
Early quantifier region: This region starts at the onset of the quantifier and 
continues for 650ms. Looks to the Target should increase during this region in 
the conditions where only the Target object is consistent with the quantifier 
(“two/all/three”). Because generating a pragmatic inference is preceded by 
semantic analysis, looks should remain equivocal between the Target and 
Distractor in the “some” condition. 
Late quantifier region: This region starts 650ms after the onset of the 
quantifier and continues for 650ms, ending after “the” (e.g., 
“…some/two/all/three of the…”). Looks to the Target should increase during 
this region in all conditions.  
For each time window, the primary dependent measure examined Target 
preference, calculated by taking the ratio of looks to the Target over looks to the 
Target and Distractor (see Huang & Snedeker (2009, 2011) for similar approaches). 





accounting for 6% of all time points. For this reason, these fixations were not 
included in the analysis. Thus, values ranged from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates exclusive 
looks to the Target and 0 indicates exclusive looks to the Distractor. Target 
preference was analyzed in a linear mixed-effects model using the lme4 software 
package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Quantifier type (scalar vs. 
number) and quantifier strength (weak vs. strong) were included as fixed effects. 
Models were created with the “maximal” random-effects structure for both subjects 
and items (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 6. In Experiment 1, Target preference fixations during the Early and 







 Estimate Std. Error t-value 
Intercept 0.0658 0.0031 20.97 
Quantifier Type -0.0072 0.0031 -2.17 
Quantifier Strength -0.0030 0.0016 -2.10 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
-0.0037 0.0017 -2.08 
Table 1. Parameter values of linear effects model in Early quantifier region of the 
word learning instructions, Experiment 1. R syntax: 
lmer(TargProp ~ 1 + QuantType * Strength + (1 + QuantType * Strength|Subject) + 
(1 + QuantType * Strength|Item), data = early, REML=FALSE) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value 
Intercept 0.7507 0.0352 21.33 
Quantifier Type -0.002 0.0027 -0.06 
Quantifier Strength -0.0276 0.0487 -0.57 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
0.0101 0.0812 0.12 
Table 2. Parameter values of linear effects model in Late quantifier region of the 
word learning instructions, Experiment 1. R syntax: 
lmer(TargProp ~ 1 + QuantType * Strength + (1 + QuantType * Strength|Subject) + 
(1 + QuantType * Strength|Item), data = late, REML=FALSE) 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates that in the Early quantifier region, there was a main effect 
of quantifier type (F(1) = 8.05, p < 0.01). There was no main effect of quantifier 
strength (p =  0.44). Critically, looks to the Target during the "all" (59%), "two" 
(66%), and "three" (66%) trials increased while looks to the Target during the "some" 





type and quantifier strength (F(1) = 4.30, p < 0.05). Planned comparisons revealed, 
within the scalar terms, there was no significant difference between Agent preference 
during “some” versus “all” trials (p = 0.28). Within the numeric terms, there was no 
significant difference between “two” and “three” trials (p = 0.93). Within the weak 
terms, analysis revealed that Agent preference during “two” trials was significantly 
greater than during “some” trials (t(15) = 3.42, p < 0.001). Within the strong terms, 
Agent preference during “three” trials was significantly greater than during “all” trials 
(t(15) = 3.08, p < 0.001). This is likely because the exact semantics of number words 
isolates the domain of quantification to the basic level, and generates a clear 
expectation that the up-coming novel word will distinguish the objects. The quantifier 
terms refer to relationships between individuals within a set, so listeners might 
entertain the possibility that the novel word is a superordinate category that refers to 
both object kinds. This may have delayed processing in the “all” compared to the 
“three” case.  
In the Late quantifier region, the main effect of quantifier type (F(1) = 12.72, 
p < 0.001) continued. However, looks to the Target increased in all conditions (some: 
61%, all: 64%, two: 72%, three: 75%), and no main effect of quantifier strength (p = 
0.55) and no interaction between quantifier type and quantifier strength was found (p 
= 0.90). This suggests that the pragmatic inference was generated during the Late 





implicature takes longer than restriction via semantic analysis (Huang & Snedeker, 
2009, 2011, in press). 
Participants’ actions were coded for accuracy on the word-learning task. A 
response was coded as accurate if the participant selected the Target. A response was 
coded as inaccurate if the participant selected any non-Target. Accuracy on the word-
learning task was high across all conditions, shown in Figure 7. Participants only 
selected either the Target or Distractor, suggesting they correctly interpreted the 
gender cue and constrained their interpretation appropriately. Because the participants 
were selecting one of two characters/objects, the likelihood of correct responses was 
compared to 50%. These analyses confirmed that accuracy was above chance for 
“some” trials (84%; t(15) = 11.60, p < 0.001), “all” trials (96%; t(15) = 27.60, p < 
0.001), and “two” trials (99%; t(15) = 55.82, p < 0.001). Accuracy for “three” trials 
was 100%. This confirms that participants had no trouble identifying the correct 
character based on the quantifier they heard. Also, participants were generating the 






Figure 7. Accuracy on the word-learning task, Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
The dependent measure of the recall task was the proportion of matches 
between responses on the word-learning and recall tasks. Only the matches for 
accurate word-learning trials were analyzed, to ensure that interpretations on “some” 
trials were made via pragmatic inference. A response was coded as a match if the 
same object was selected in both word learning and recall. A response was coded as 
not a match if a different object was selected. The proportion of matches was 
calculated within each condition as the number of matches over the number of trials. 
Overall, there were 71% matches between responses on corresponding word-learning 
and recall trials. Figure 8 illustrates the proportion of matches per condition.  





the lme4 software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
Quantifier type (scalar vs. number) and quantifier strength (weak vs. strong) were 
included as fixed effects. Models were created with the “maximal” random-effects 
structure for both subjects and items (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). However, 
when the model failed to converge within 50,000 iterations, the model was estimated 
without random intercepts. Analyses revealed no significant main effect of quantifier 
type (p = 0.90) or quantifier strength (p = 0.66). Critically, there was a significant 
interaction between quantifier type and quantifier strength (F(1) = 3.73, p < 0.05). 
Planned comparisons revealed that, within the scalar terms, the proportion of matches 
for “some” trials was significantly lower than “all” trials (t(15) = 2.63, p < 0.05). 
Within the numeric terms, the proportion of matches was not significantly different 
between “two” and “three” trials (p > 0.80). Within the weak terms, the proportion of 
matches for “some” trials was significantly lower than “two” trials (t(15) = -3.19, p < 
0.01). Within the strong terms, the proportion of matches was not significantly 
different between the “all” and “three” trials (p > 0.40). The fact that matches for 
“some” trials were significantly lower than the other conditions suggests that the 
semantic meaning of "some" was encoded in memory during "some" trials and this 






Figure 8. Proportion of matches between word-learning and recall responses in 
Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value 
Intercept 1.3602 0.2935 4.64 
Quantifier Type -0.0430 0.3301 -0.13 
Quantifier Strength -0.1655 0.3785 -0.44 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
-0.1372 0.0682 -2.73 
Table 3. Results of mixed multinomial logistic model of matches between responses 
to word-learning and recall tasks, Experiment 1. 





+ QuantType * Strength|Item), data = matchdata, family = binomial) 
 
Critically, the recall task allows one to link the processing of scalar inferences 
(measured by eye-movements during the critical instructions) and memory for their 
interpretations (measured by actions in the recall task). If longer consideration of the 
semantic meaning of “some” during the word-learning task lead to a stronger memory 
trace and greater interference at recall, then time spent looking to the Target character 
may predict recall accuracy. However, if only the pragmatic meaning for “some” is 
encoded in memory, then time spent looking to the Target character should not predict 
recall accuracy. A Pearson correlation was computed to assess the relationship between 
Target preference (during the word-learning instructions) and Match proportion on the 
recall task. This relationship is plotted in Figure 9. The analysis revealed no significant 
relationship between Target preference and Match proportion in the “all” (p = 0.14), 
“two” (p = 0.76), or “three” (p = 0.74) conditions. However, there was a significant 
correlation in the “some” condition (r = 0.38, p < 0.05). This suggests that longer 
consideration of the semantic meaning of “some” led to a stronger memory trace and 






Figure 9. Scatterplot of Target fixations during word-learning and Matches on 
recall responses in Experiment 1.  
2.6 Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test whether the semantic meaning of 
“some” is encoded in memory before a pragmatic inference is made. This addresses 





interpretation of a sentence is encoded in memory. These results suggest that when a 
scalar inference was generated during “some” trials, interpretations based on the 
semantic and pragmatic meanings were encoded in memory. This lead to interference 
during recall, resulting in lower match proportions for “some” trials compared to 
“two/all/three” trials. Moreover, during word learning, longer consideration of the 
semantic meaning (measured by looks to the Distractor) led to greater interference 
during recall. This suggests that initial interpretations are encoded in memory prior to 
the adoption of final interpretations. 
These findings support a model of language processing where activated 
representations are incrementally encoded in memory, before competition between 
them has been resolved. The results are consistent with the Good Enough processing 
theory that claims that ambiguity between representations may never be resolved 
(Ferreira et al., 2001; Ferreira et al., 2002; Ferreira & Patson, 2007). Prior work in 
support of this theory has come largely from syntactic processing, but these data 
extends the model to pragmatic processing. This suggests that activated 
representations at all levels of processing, not just syntactic, may lead to multiple 
interpretations being encoded in memory. 
However, alternative explanations for performance on the recall task must be 
considered. One possibility is that participants recalled the Distractor object more 
often for “some” trials because they spent a greater amount of time fixating on the 
Distractor during word learning, strengthening memory of that object. During word-





only one interpretation of each of these terms was available. However, during “some” 
trials, both the Target and Distractor objects were possible interpretations. Thus, 
memory interference may depend on the extent to which the Distractor object was 
attended to during word learning, whether or not an inference was made. Indeed, prior 
research in memory encoding provides strong evidence that attention during encoding 
directly influences recall performance (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 
1984; Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; 
Mulligan, 1998), by creating more "durable" memory traces (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
Craik & Tulving, 1975) or higher quality representations (Awh & Jonides, 2001; 
Awh, Dhalival, Christensen, Matsukura, 2001). This alternative explanation will be 







Findings from Experiment 1 revealed that there were fewer matches in the 
“some” condition compared to “two/all/three” conditions. One possibility is that the 
semantic meaning of “some” persisted in memory and interfered with recall. This 
would suggest that lower level analyses do not need to be completed before the 
interpretation of a sentence is encoded in memory. However, another possibility is 
that the results were due to task demands. The Distractor object may have been stored 
in memory during “some” trials simply because it was attended to longer in that 
condition than the others, where semantic analysis quickly restricted the set of 
possible targets. Indeed, longer consideration of the Distractor object in the “some” 
condition led to fewer matches between word learning and recall. 
In this chapter, I will flesh out the logic behind this alternative hypothesis by 
discussing prior work on visual attention and memory, and discuss how this 
relationship may have led to the results obtained in Experiment 1. Next, I describe an 
experiment that tests this possibility by replicating the conditions of Experiment 1 but 






3.2 Visual attention and memory 
 In order to complete the word-learning task, participants had to map novel 
words to novel objects by interpreting a sentence that featured a scalar term. They did 
so by visually inspecting a display (reproduced in Figure 10). There was only one 
object type featured on the display that was consistent with the scalar terms “all,” 
“two,” or “three.” The results showed that, following the presentation of these scalar 
terms, visual attention was quickly restricted to the correct object type. However, 
when participants were presented with a sentence featuring “some,” they looked to 
both object types (consistent with the semantic meaning of “some”) before restricting 
their visual attention to only one object type (consistent with the pragmatic meaning 
of “some”).  Thus, only one object type was visually attended to during “all,” “two,” 
and “three” trials while two object types were visually attended to during “some” 
trials. Later, recall of the novel word was worse in the “some” condition compared to 
the “all,” “two,” and “three” conditions. One possibility is that the worse performance 
in the “some” condition is the result of visual attention being paid to both object types 






Figure 10. Sample display from the word-learning task. The girl in upper-right 
quadrant has a subset of one object and the girl in the lower-right quadrant has all 
of a second object. 
 
Indeed, prior work exploring the relationship between attention and memory 
retrieval suggests that attention during encoding directly effects recall (Baddeley et 
al., 1984; Fisk & Schneider, 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Mulligan, 1998). For example, 
Craik et al. (1996) asked listeners to recall lists of words or word pairs as they 
completed a concurrent visual reaction time task. When the task was performed 
during encoding, divided attention led to poorer memory performance. In contrast, 
when the task was performed during recall, there was no reduction in memory. These 
results suggest that divided attention during encoding specifically hinders memory 





objects superimposed in space, observers were better able to report two aspects of one 
of the objects than one aspect from each of the two objects. The author concluded that 
visual processing is limited by the number of objects that require attention. Recall that 
in the “some” trials of the word-learning task, two objects were under consideration, 
compared to one object for the “all/two/three” trials. Thus, divided attention during 
encoding as well as the higher number of objects to be discriminated may have led to 
a weaker memory trace of the Target object.  
Experiment 2 tests this possibility by replicating Experiment 1 with a context 
that blocks the pragmatic inference but retains the amount of attention paid to two 
objects during “some” trials. Because the inference is blocked, listeners should only 
consider the semantic meaning of “some” when they hear the instructions. This 
should lead to equivalent looks to the Target and Distractor objects because their 
quantities are both consistent with this meaning. Thus, if simply paying visual 
attention to the Distractor object in “some” trials led to poor recall, there should be a 
similar result when the same attention is paid to that object but the pragmatic 
interpretation is not considered. However, if the poor recall was due to multiple 
interpretations competing in memory, there should be no interference when only the 






3.3 Downward-entailing contexts 
In order to block the pragmatic inference, Experiment 2 presents “some” in a 
downward-entailing context. When one sentence (A) entails another (B) it means that 
for every situation in which A is true, B is also true. For example, “I ate pizza with 
anchovies” entails “I ate pizza” (Chierchia, Frazier, & Clifton, 2009). Upward-
entailing contexts preserve the relation of semantic strength between a set of 
expressions. For example, the stimuli in Experiment 1 were presented in an upward-
entailing context as in (10): 
(10)  a. Click on the girl that has some of the blickets. 
   b. Click on the girl that has all of the blickets 
Here, (4a) is a weaker statement than (10b) because instructing someone to click on 
“some” of the blickets does not instruct them to click on “all” of them. However, 
listeners typically strengthen (10a) with a pragmatic inference and assume that 
“some” means “not all.” In contrast, downward-entailing contexts like (11) block the 
pragmatic inference.  
(11) a. If the girl has some of the blickets, click on her. 
b. If the girl has all of the blickets, click on her. 
In (11) the semantics of “all” is consistent with “some.” That is, if the girl has all of 
the blickets then she must have some of them. This makes (11a) stronger than (11b) 
so a pragmatic inference is not supported. Prior research suggests that people are less 
likely to make scalar inferences in downward-entailing contexts like negation and 





Frazier, 2010). For example, Chierchia et al. (2009) asked students to complete 
sentence fragments like “John has two cars…” or “If John has two cars…” 
Afterward, the students were asked to select one of the following sentences that fit 
how they interpreted the sentence: John has two or more cars (weak) or John has 
exactly two cars (strong). Eighty-nine percent of respondents who completed the 
simple sentence chose the strengthened interpretation of “two.” In contrast, only 64% 
of the respondents who completed the conditional sentence chose the strengthened 
interpretation. Thus, the downward-entailing conditional context led to less 
strengthening of “two” to mean “exactly two.”  
 Online measures have revealed a different processing time-course for scalar 
terms in downward- versus upward-entailment contexts (Panizza, Chierchia, & 
Clifton, 2009; Panizza, Huang, Chierchia, & Snedeker, 2009). Panizza, Chierchia, 
and Clifton (2009) found that numerals in upward-entailing contexts were read longer 
than in downward-entailing contexts. Also, during a following context that required 
the inference to be made, there were more regressions to the number term when it 
appeared in a downward- versus upward-entailing context. These findings suggest 
that the inference was not made when the number was encountered in the downward-
entailing context, but it was generated when the following context supported it. These 
results complement a visual world experiment by Panizza, Huang, and colleagues. 
Using a paradigm similar to Huang and Snedeker (2009), the authors found that eye 
movements to a target associated with the pragmatic interpretation of “some” were 





suggests that participants did not generate the inference to restrict reference to the 
target prior to disambiguation. 
 Thus, based on prior work (Chierchia, 2004; Chierchia et al., 2009; Schwarz 
et al., 2010; Panizza, Chierchia et al., 2009; Panizza, Huang et al., 2009), scalar 
inferences are not expected to be generated when “some” is featured in a downward-
entailing context. Eye movements should show roughly equal looks to the Target and 
Distractor following the onset of “some” while looks to the Target should increase 
following “all/two/three.” However, because participants will be cued to ultimately 
select the Target, accuracy on the word-learning task should be high. 
If increased attention to the Distractor object during word learning is enough 
to encode its visual representation in memory and cause interference during recall, 
accuracy should be lower for “some” trials compared to “two/all/three” trials on the 
recall task, replicating the results of Experiment 1. However, if attention to the 
Distractor object does not impact memory encoding, then recall rates should be 
similar across all trial types. Since only one interpretation is available for all trial 
types, memory interference is expected to be limited. Critically, looks to the 
Distractor should not predict recall rates if simply looking at the object does not 






3.4 Experiment 2 
3.4.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Maryland were recruited 
for this study. They received either $5 or course credit for their participation. All 
participants were native English speakers. 
3.4.2 Procedures and Materials 
The procedures and materials were similar to Experiment 1 with two key 
changes. First, the same four quantifiers featured in Experiment 1 were presented in 
Experiment 2 in a downward-entailing context, as in (11). Second, the correct 
answers for word-learning trials were cued by a star appearing next to the Target 
object. The number of cued trials depended on the number of correct trials for each 
condition in Experiment 1. For example, Experiment 1 participants correctly selected 
the Target on 85% of “some” trials, so 85% of “some” trials were cued in Experiment 
2. The delay between trial onset and cue presentation on a given trial in Experiment 2 
was equivalent to the average reaction time for that trial in Experiment 1. Participants 
were told in advance that this cue indicates the correct answer and that it would 
appear on some trials and not others.  
3.4.3 Results 
As in Experiment 1, eye movements were examined to determine whether 





proportion of fixations to the Target was calculated for two regions over the duration 
of the quantifier and up to the onset of the novel word: 
Early quantifier region: This region starts at the onset of the quantifier and 
continues for 650ms. Looks to the Target should increase during this region in 
the conditions where only the Target object is consistent with the quantifier 
(“two/all/three”). Because generating a pragmatic inference is preceded by 
semantic analysis, looks should remain equivocal between the Target and 
Distractor in the “some” condition. 
Late quantifier region: This region starts 650ms after the onset of the 
quantifier and continues for 650ms, ending after “the” (e.g., 
“…some/two/all/three of the…”). Looks to the Target should increase during 
this region in all conditions.  






Figure 11. In Experiment 2, Target preference fixations during the Early and 
Late quantifier regions within the instruction.  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value 
Intercept 0.6447 0.0347 18.56 
Quantifier Type -0.0625 0.0460 -1.39 
Quantifier Strength 0.0002 0.0383 -0.01 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
-0.0378 0.0622 -0.61 
Table 4. Parameter values of linear effects model in Early quantifier region of the 
word learning instructions, Experiment 2. R syntax: 
lmer(TargProp ~ 1 + QuantType * Strength + (1 + QuantType * Strength|Subject) + 
(1 + QuantType * Strength|Item), data = early, REML=FALSE) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value 





Quantifier Type -0. 0.  
Quantifier Strength -0. 0. - 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
0. 0. 0 
Table 5. Parameter values of linear effects model in Late quantifier region of the 
word learning instructions, Experiment 2. R syntax: 
lmer(TargProp ~ 1 + QuantType * Strength + (1 + QuantType * Strength|Subject) + 
(1 + QuantType * Strength|Item), data = late, REML=FALSE) 
 
 
Figure 11 illustrates that in the Early quantifier region, looks to the Target 
were higher in the "two" (65%) and "three" (63%) trials than the "some" (53%) and 
"all" (55%) trials, leading to a main effect of quantifier type (F(1) = 6.09, p < 0.05). 
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no main effect of quantifier strength (p = 0.48) 
or interaction between quantifier type and quantifier strength (p = 0.55) during this 
region. This is because Target looks during the "all" trials were not as high in 
Experiment 2 during this region (55%) as they were in Experiment 1 (59%), leading 
to a smaller difference between looks in the "all" versus "some" trials (4% in Exp. 1, 
2% in Exp. 2). This delay in looks to the Target in the "all" condition may be because 
the use of a conditional introduces a third possibility that was not there in Experiment 
1: that neither of the two girls has all of an object. In Experiment 1 participants heard 
"Click on the girl that has all of the blickets," making it clear that one of the girls was 
the Target. However, in Experiment 2 participants heard "If the girl has all of the 





the blickets. This may have caused a prolonged uncertainty that extended the time 
during which participants were comparing the number of objects belonging to the 
characters. This did not happen in the "two" and "three" trials, where the exact 
number quickly identified one of the two girls. The eye movements in the "some" 
trials of Experiment 2 also pattern closely with Experiment 1, likely because the 
presence of objects next to each girl meant that they had to have "some" of 
something. 
In the Late quantifier region, looks to the Target increased in the "all" (65%), "two" 
(75%), and "three" (75%) conditions while looks to the Target in the "some" (57%) 
condition did not increase as much, leading to a main effect of quantifier type (F(1) = 
15.67, p < 0.001). There was no main effect of quantifier strength (p = 0.54) or 
interaction between quantifier type and quantifier strength (p = 0.95). The lack of an 
interaction between the variables was expected because the downward-entailing 
context blocked the scalar inference, making the total-set and subset objects equally 
likely to be the target. Participants’ actions were coded for accuracy on the word-
learning task. Figure 12 shows that accuracy on the word-learning task was high 
across all conditions. As in Experiment 1, participants only selected either the Target 
or Distractor, suggesting they correctly interpreted the gender cue and constrained 
their interpretation appropriately. Because the participants were selecting one of two 
characters/objects, the likelihood of correct responses was compared to 50%. These 
analyses confirmed that accuracy was above chance for “some” trials (84%; t(15) = 





t(15) = 55.82, p < 0.001). Accuracy for “three” trials was 100%. This confirms that 
participants were paying attention to the cues and selected the Target accordingly.  
 
Figure 12. Accuracy on the word-learning task, Experiment 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
Actions during the recall task were analyzed using the same analytic strategy 
as Experiment 1. Again, the maximal model failed to converge with 50,000 iterations 
so the model was estimated without random intercepts. Overall, there were 65% 
matches between responses on corresponding word-learning and recall trials. Figure 





“all”: 64%; “three”: 66%). The match results of Experiment 1 are included for 




Figure 13. Proportion of matches between word learning and recall responses in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 Estimate Std. Error z-value 
Intercept 1.3367 0.2830 4.72 
Quantifier Type -0.0267 0.3321 -0.08 
Quantifier Strength -0.1453 0.3786 -0.38 
Quantifier Type x 
Quantifier Strength 
-0.7632 0.4325 -1.77 
Table 6. Results of mixed multinomial logistic model of matches between responses 
to word-learning and recall tasks, Experiment 2. 





+ QuantType * Strength|Item), data = matchdata, family = binomial) 
 
 
The final analysis examined the relationship between eye movements and 
recall. If the visual representation of a Distractor object is encoded during word 
learning regardless of how the instructions are interpreted, a higher proportion of 
looks to this object should predict recall rates across all trial types. However, if the 
visual representation of a Distractor object does not interfere with recall, the 
proportion of looks to this object should not predict recall rates. As in Experiment 1, a 
Person correlation was computed to examine the relationship between Target 
preference (during the word-learning instructions) and Match proportion on the recall 
task. These analyses revealed no significant relationship between these variables for 
any of the conditions (“some”: p = 0.92, “all”: p = 0.28; “three”: 0.30; “two”: 0.06). 







Figure 14. Scatterplot of Target fixations during word-learning and Matches on 
recall responses in Experiment 2. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to evaluate the validity of the memory task in 





to the Distractor object during word learning interfered with recall of the Target 
object. The results of Experiment 2 showed that when the same amount of attention 
was paid to the Distractor object but there was no scalar inference, recall of the Target 
object was similar across conditions. This suggests that visual attention to the 
Distractor was not enough to interfere with recall. Thus, the lower proportion of 
matches in the “some” condition of Experiment 1 were not due to greater visual 
attention to the Distractor object during the word-learning task in the “some” 
condition compared to the “all/two/three” conditions. 
 These results also address scalar inference processing in downward-entailing 
contexts. Prior work suggests that scalar inferences are not drawn as frequently in 
downward-entailing versus upward-entailing contexts (Chierchia, 2004; Chierchia et 
al., 2009; Schwarz et al., 2010). Eye-movement data during the word-learning 
instructions support this finding. Analysis showed that Target preference in the 
“some” condition was significantly below the other conditions even through the Late 
quantifier region, suggesting that the inference had not been made. 
The combined results of Experiments 1 and 2 build on previous work 
investigating the persistence of multiple sentence interpretations in memory. In 
previous studies, responses to comprehension questions suggested that initial 
interpretations based on incorrect syntactic analysis can be accessed even after a 
sentence is complete (Christianson et al., 2001; Christianson et al., 2006; Ferreira et 
al., 2001; Patson et al., 2009; Christianson, 2008; Slattery et al., 2013; Malyutina & 





interfere with the processing of a subsequent sentence (Slattery et al., 2013). The 
present work goes farther to show that an initial interpretation can be available well 
after sentence completion, even after hearing intervening sentences. Participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2 responded to memory probes after completing all 16 word-
learning trials.  
However, it remains unclear whether the semantic and pragmatic 
interpretations are both immediately accessed when “some” is encountered. The 
results of Experiments 1 and 2 are compatible with the possibility that the semantic 
meaning of “some” is computed and encoded in memory prior to the computation of 
the pragmatic interpretation. However, it is also possible that both interpretations are 
initially available and encoded in memory before the pragmatic interpretation is 
selected. Eye-movement analyses from Experiment 1 showed that listeners made an 
equal proportion of looks to the Target and Distractor prior to the pragmatic 
inference. This suggests that the semantic interpretation of “some” was available 
during this time, but it cannot address whether the pragmatic interpretation was also 
available since equal looks to the Target and Distractor is consistent with both 
interpretations. It could be the case that the semantic and pragmatic interpretations are 
both available prior to the inference and are in competition, similar to competing 
parses during syntactic processing. Alternatively, it could be the case that only the 
semantic meaning is available prior to the pragmatic inference, suggesting that there 
is some amount of semantic analysis that must be computed before the inference is 







 The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that initial interpretations can 
persist in memory even when contextual information is provided. However, it is still 
unknown whether both the semantic and pragmatic meanings of “some” are available 
immediately after the word is encountered, or if only the semantic meaning is initially 
accessed. According to constraint-based accounts of scalar inferencing, listeners 
generate probabilistic expectations about possible speaker meanings as a sentence 
unfolds, which can include either the semantic or pragmatic meaning of “some” 
(Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015). This suggests that, like syntactic processing, these two 
meaning-based representations are active at the same time and in direct competition. 
If both meanings are accessed immediately after “some” is encountered, there should 
be evidence of competition prior to the adoption of the pragmatic inference. If there is 
a delay before the pragmatic interpretation is generated, there may be no evidence of 
competition. In the following sections, I discuss the relationship between cognitive 
control and competition between representations. Then, I talk about cognitive 
control’s potential role in pragmatic inferencing. Finally, I describe an experiment 
that engages cognitive control to probe for the presence of competition between 






4.2 Cognitive control  
 One way to investigate whether both semantic and pragmatic meanings are 
activated immediately following “some” is to look for evidence of cognitive control. 
Cognitive control is a domain-general mechanism that detects and resolves conflict 
during information-processing tasks (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001). It plays a specific role in language processing by facilitating recovery from 
misanalysis (Novick et al., 2005, 2010). Prior research suggests that cognitive control 
is triggered when an initial syntactic analysis is contradicted by incoming linguistic 
input, and inhibits this misanalysis in favor of a competing alternative (Novick et al., 
2005, 2010; January et al., 2009; Ye & Zhou, 2009; Hsu & Novick, 2016).  
Importantly, cognitive control engagement does not seem to be limited to 
syntactic processing. Prior research using neuroimaging and patient studies suggests 
that cognitive control is also engaged when selecting between competing semantic 
representations (Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farrah, 1997; Thompson-
Schill, Swick, Farah, D’Esposito, Kan, & Knight, 1998; Badre, Poldrack, Pare-
Blagoev, Insler, & Wagner, 2005; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). 
Thus, it may be the case that cognitive control is also engaged during scalar 
inferencing, when the semantic and pragmatic meanings of “some” are in 
competition. Recall from Chapter 2 that some accounts of scalar inference processing 
assume that the inference is preceded by semantic analysis, suggesting that during the 
time before the inference only the semantic meaning of “some” is being considered 





time during which both the semantic and pragmatic meanings of “some” are active 
and contrasted with one another to select the more likely interpretation (Degen & 
Tanenhaus, 2015). If this is the case, competition between these meanings may 
trigger cognitive control. 
Empirical support for the engagement of cognitive control during inference 
processing comes from a dual-task experiment where participants had to complete an 
executive function task while judging whether sentences featuring scalar terms were 
true or false. When presented with a sentence like “some oaks are trees” while 
holding a complex dot pattern in memory, readers made more responses consistent 
with the semantic meaning compared to the pragmatic meaning of “some” even 
though the pragmatic meaning is typically preferred (DeNeys & Schaeken, 2007). 
The authors concluded that the same cognitive control processes that are engaged by 
the dot pattern task also contribute to scalar inferencing. However, the task they used 
is better characterized as a test of visuospatial working memory, and does not induce 
representational conflict like standard cognitive control tasks (Miyake, Friedman, 
Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001). Thus, a more valid measure of cognitive control is 
required.  
 
4.3 Conflict adaptation paradigm  
Evidence of the causal role of cognitive control during syntactic reanalysis has 





is engaged when conflict is detected, and it lessens the cost of processing later 
conflict (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). 
For example, the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) asks participants to name the ink color of 
a printed color term that either matches (e.g., the word BLUE printed in blue ink) or 
does not match (e.g., the word BLUE printed in red). When the ink color and word 
does not match, conflict arises and participants have to inhibit its orthographic 
representation (BLUE) in favor of its visual representation (RED). Critically, if the 
non-matching term is preceded by another non-matching term versus a matching 
term, the processing difficulty associated with the conflicting representations is 
attenuated (Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Banai, 2007; Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2004). This suggests that cognitive control is triggered by the 
conflict experienced by the first non-matching term and facilitates processing when 
conflict re-arises with the second non-matching term.  
Hsu & Novick (2016) recently used this paradigm to show that engaging 
cognitive control leads to successful revision of temporarily ambiguous sentences. 
Participants were presented with a Stroop task interleaved with a visual world task. 
The visual world task required participants to correctly analyze a temporarily 
ambiguous sentence (e.g., “Put the dumpling on the plate into the wok”). Due to the 
bias of the verb “put,” listeners initially assume that “on the plate” is a destination for 
“the dumpling,” and must revise this analysis when later information indicates that it 
is a modifier. Participants were faster to revise these initial misanalyses when the 





looks to the correct destination increased 400ms earlier when cognitive control was 
engaged. This finding suggests that competition between two syntactic analyses cued 
the engagement of cognitive control. The authors argue that this led to a decrease in 
activation of the irrelevant analysis, leading to faster recovery from the initial 
interpretation. 
Experiment 3 extends the findings of Hsu and Novick (2016) to pragmatic 
processing. Using a conflict-adaptation paradigm, this experiment tests for evidence 
that cognitive control is recruited during scalar inferencing. Cognitive control may be 
used to facilitate the adoption of the pragmatic inference by inhibiting the semantic 
meaning just as cognitive control engagement works to inhibit misanalyses during 
syntactic processing. The timing of cognitive control engagement is of particular 
interest in the case of scalar inferences because it remains unclear whether both 
semantic and pragmatic interpretations are immediately available following “some”. 
If there is a period of semantic analysis that precedes the generation of the pragmatic 
inference then there should be a delay in adoption of the pragmatic inference 
regardless of cognitive control engagement because the pragmatic meaning is 
unavailable. However, if both interpretations are initially available, cognitive control 
engagement may have a faciliatory effect in the period immediately following the 
onset of “some”.  
Participants in Experiment 3 completed two interleaved tasks: A Stroop task 
to engage cognitive control, and the word-learning task from Experiment 1. The 





inference (“some”) versus trials that did not (“all”), and those that were preceded by 
engagement of cognitive control (incongruent Stroop trials) versus no engagement of 
cognitive control (congruent Stroop trials). Analyses will look for evidence that 
engaging cognitive control facilitates processing of these scalar terms, leading to 
either (a) higher accuracy on word learning responses; (b) shorter word-learning 
response time; and/or (c) greater looks to the Target character during word-learning 
instructions. Eye-movement analyses will further reveal whether the potential 
cognitive control effect occurs immediately following the onset of “some” or after a 
delay. If both the semantic and pragmatic interpretations are both immediately 
available, then engaging cognitive control should facilitate processing quickly 
following “some” during word-learning trials preceded by an incongruent Stroop trial 
compared to a congruent Stroop trial. However, if only the semantic meaning is 
initially accessed, then cognitive control engagement should have no effect 
immediately following “some”. A second possibility is that cognitive control is 
recruited only after the pragmatic inference is generated, to help overcome the initial 
semantic analysis. If this is the case, there may be evidence of cognitive control 
engagement at a later time period following “some”. Finally, cognitive control may 
have no role in scalar inferencing, in which case engagement should have no effect on 
how quickly the pragmatic inference is adopted. The results of “some” trials will be 
compared to trials that feature “all”. Because only one interpretation of “all” is 
considered during processing, there should be no difference in “all” trials preceded by 





4.4 Experiment 3 
4.4.1 Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Maryland were recruited 
for this study. They received either $5 or course credit for their participation. All 
participants were native English speakers.  
 
4.4.2 Procedures 
Experiment 3 was a conflict-adaptation task that interleaved trials of the word-
learning task and a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). During Stroop trials, participants were 
presented with color terms that either matched in font color (e.g., BLUE printed in 
blue) or did not match in font color (e.g. BLUE printed in red). The task was to use a 
three-button mouse to indicate the font color. The response set always consisted of 
blue, red, and yellow. Sixty of these trials were Congruous (color term matches font 
color) and 60 were Incongruous (color term does not match font color). Each trial 
began with a 500ms fixation followed by either a Stroop or word-learning stimulus 
for 1000ms. After 1000ms or once a selection is made in the word-learning trial, the 
trial ended and another trial began. Prior to the experimental trials, participants 
completed 2 word-learning practice trials and 20 Stroop practice trials to become 






Figure 15. Example of four trial sequences in Experiment 3: (a) Congruent-
Some, (b) Incongruent-Some, (c) Congruent-All, (d) Incongruent-All.  
 
4.4.3 Materials 
The word-learning trials featured two quantifier instructions from Experiment 
1: "Click on the girl who has some/all of the blickets." To test for cross-task conflict 
adaptation, trial sequences were pseudo-randomized to form four sequence types. 
There were 12 pairs of critical trials: congruent-all sequences, incongruent-all 
sequences, congruent-some sequences, and incongruent-some sequences. Thus, 





word-learning trials featuring "all.” There were 24 congruent Stroop trials and 24 
incongruent Stroop trials. Figure 15 illustrates these four types of trial sequences.  
A total of 48 filler visual world trials featuring numeric quantifiers 
“two/three” and 72 filler Stroop trials were included to ensure that participants could 
not predict the condition of an upcoming trial. Stroop trials were preceded by other 
Stroop trials (n = 45) and visual world trials (n = 74) and visual world trials were 
preceded by Stroop trials (n = 27) and other visual world trials (n = 21). 
 
4.4.4 Results 
The first set of analyses were conducted to verify that the Stroop task results 
fit the expected pattern found in previous research.  This verifies that incongruent 
Stroop trials induced conflict and engaged cognitive control, and that the congruent 
Stroop trials did not. Dependent variables were analyzed using the same strategy as 
Experiments 1 and 2 except the models included only congruency as a fixed effect.  
The Stroop task was analyzed for accuracy and reaction time. A Stroop trial 
was coded as correct if the participant named the ink color of the word within the 
1000ms allowed. A Stroop trial was coded as incorrect if the participant gave a 
response that was not the ink color of the word or did not respond within 1000ms. 
The analyses revealed a significant difference between accuracy on congruent Stroop 
trials and incongruent Stroop trials (χ2(1) = 32.39, p < 0.01) such that accuracy was 





Response time was measured from the onset of the color term presentation to the 
onset of the participant’s verbal response. The analyses revealed a significant 
difference between reaction time on congruent Stroop trials and incongruent Stroop 
trials (χ2(1) = 27.04, p < 0.01) such that reaction time was longer for incongruent 
Stroop trials (891ms) than congruent Stroop trials (804ms). This confirms that 
participants had more difficulty naming incongruent than congruent Stroop trials, 
suggesting that the incongruent trials engaged cognitive control. 
The remainder of the results are organized around three main questions. When 
cognitive control is engaged, do listeners (a) make the scalar inference more 
frequently (fewer action errors); (b) make the scalar inference more quickly (shorter 
action response time); (c) consider the semantic meaning of “some” to a lesser extent 
(greater looks to the Target character)?  
Participants’ actions were coded for accuracy on the word-learning task. As in 
Experiments 1 and 2, a response was coded as accurate if the participant selected the 
Target. A response was coded as inaccurate if the participant selected any non-Target. 
Figure 16 shows that accuracy on the word-learning task was high in both conditions 
(“some”: 95%; “all”: 92%). Accuracy was analyzed in a mixed multinomial logistic 
model using the lme4 software package in R (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2014). Scalar term (some vs. all) and prior Stroop (congruent vs. incongruent) were 
included as fixed effects. Models were created with the “maximal” random-effects 
structure for both subjects and items (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). However, 





without random intercepts. Analyses revealed no main effect of scalar term (p = 
0.50), no main effect of prior Stroop (p = 0.75), and no interaction between the two 
variables (p = 0.31). These results suggests that cognitive control engagement does 
not increase the probability that a scalar inference is made. 
 
 
Figure 16. Accuracy on the word-learning task by prior Stroop type, Experiment 
3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 





Intercept 5.5385 1.1695 4.74 
Scalar term -1.0447 1.5416 -0.68 
Prior Stroop -0.4957 1.5746 -0.32 
Scalar term x Prior Stroop 2.9600 2.8885 0.31 
Table 7. Results of mixed multinomial logistic model of accuracy on the word-
learning task, Experiment 3. 
glmer(accuracy ~ 1 + scalar * priorstroop + (0 + Condition * priorstroop |Subject) + 
(0 + Condition * priorstroop |Item), data = stroopsent, family = binomial) 
 
 Participants’ actions were also coded for response time. Response time was 
measured from the end of the instructions to the point at which the participant clicked 
on a character. Reaction time is depicted in Figure 17. Response time was analyzed in 
a linear mixed-effects model. Scalar term (some vs. all) and prior Stroop (congruent 
vs. incongruent) were included as fixed effects. The model was created with the 
“maximal” random-effects structure for both subjects and items (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Analyses revealed a main effect of scalar term (F(1) = 4.24, 
p < 0.05). However, there was no main effect of prior Stroop (p = 0.41) or interaction 
between scalar term and prior Stroop (p = 0.22). These results suggest that cognitive 







Figure 17. Reaction time on the word-learning task by prior Stroop type, 
Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value 
Intercept 0.5770 0.0266 25.46 
Scalar term -0.0898 0.01042 -8.61 
Prior Stroop 0.0108 0.0279 0.39 
Scalar term x Prior Stroop 0.0296 0.0147 2.015 
Table 8. Results of linear mixed effect model of reaction time on the word-learning 
task, Experiment 3. 





Condition * priorstroop |Item), data = stroopsent, REML = FALSE) 
 
The next analysis looked at eye movements during the Early and Late 
quantifier regions of the word-learning task. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the primary 
dependent measure examined Target preference, calculated by taking the ratio of 
looks to the Target over looks to the Target and Distractor. Target preference was 
analyzed in a mixed multinomial logistic model with scalar term and prior Stroop 
included as fixed effects. The models were created with the “maximal” random-
effects structure for both subjects and items. However, when the models failed to 
converge within 50,000 iterations, the models were estimated without random 
intercepts. Figure 18 shows the proportion of looks to the Target from the onset of the 
quantifier to the end of the sentence, separated by prior Stroop trial type. Analyses of 
the Early quantifier region revealed a significant main effect of scalar term (F(1) = 
104.11, p < 0.01), no significant main effect of prior Stroop type (p = 0.34), but a 
significant interaction between scalar term and prior Stroop type (F(1) = 4.06, p < 
0.05). Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference in Target looks during 
“some” versus “all” word-learning trials preceded by congruent Stroop trials (t(39) = 
-2.81, p < 0.01). However, there was no significant difference in Target looks during 
“some” versus” all trials preceded by incongruent Stroop trials (p = 0.39). There was 
also no significant difference within the “all” trials when preceded by congruent 
versus incongruent Stroop trials (p = 0.80). Critically, within “some” trials, there was 





versus incongruent (t(39) = -2.68, p < 0.05) such that Target looks were higher when 
word learning was preceded by incongruent rather than congruent trials. These results 
suggest that engaging cognitive control prior to the word learning task facilitated 
scalar inference processing by promoting consideration of the pragmatic 
interpretation over the semantic meaning of “some”. By the Late quantifier region, 
Target looks were similar across conditions and trials preceded by different Stroop 
trials. Analyses of the Late quantifier region revealed no significant main effect of 
condition (p = 0.18). There was a marginally significant effect of prior Stroop type 
(F(1) = 4.12, p = 0.05). There was no significant interaction between condition and 
prior Stroop type (p = 0.14).  
 To determine when the facilitating effect of cognitive control engagement 
occurred, a second analysis examined when Target preference exceeded chance for 
each of the four pair sequences. The results show that Target looks in the “all” trials 
rose above chance during the 200-300ms time window when preceded by congruent 
Stroop trials (t(39) = 2.28, p < 0.05) and incongruent Stroop trials (t(39) = 2.75, p < 
0.01). Target looks in the “some” trials preceded by congruent Stroop trials exceeded 
chance in the 800-900ms time window. In contrast, Target fixations in “some” trials 
preceded by incongruent Stroop trials exceeded chance in the 500-600ms time 
window. This finding suggests that cognitive control engagement accelerates scalar 







Figure 18. In Experiment 3, Target preference fixations during the Early and 
Late quantifier regions within the instruction. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value 
Intercept 0.8318 0.0376 22.15 
Condition -0.0072 0.0402 -0.18 
Prior Stroop -0.1306 0.0460 -2.84 
Condition x prior 






Table 9. Results of linear mixed effects model in the Early quantifier region in 
Experiment 3.  
lmer(targetprop ~ 1 + condition * priorstroop + (0 + condition * priorstroop |subject) 
+ (0 + condition * priorstroop |trial), data = early, REML=FALSE) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value 
Intercept 0.8335 0.0379 22.00 
Condition -0.0050 0.0402 -0.13 
Prior Stroop -0.1206 0.0580 -2.08 
Condition x prior 
Stroop interaction 0.1059 0.0703 1.50 
 
Table 10. Results of linear mixed effects model in the Late quantifier region in 
Experiment 3. 
lmer(targetprop ~ 0 + condition * priorstroop + (0 + condition * priorstroop |subject) 
+ (1 + condition * priorstroop |trial), data = late, REML=FALSE) 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Chapter 4 looked for evidence that the semantic and pragmatic meanings of 
“some” are in competition prior to the inference being adopted. To test this, listeners 
completed the word-learning task featured in Experiments 1 and 2, preceded by a 
Stroop trial in which cognitive control was either engaged or not engaged. Because 
cognitive control is recruited when there is competition between representations, 
evidence that cognitive control is involved in scalar inferencing prior to the inference 
would suggest that both semantic and pragmatic meanings of “some” are activated 
during this time. The results of Experiment 3 showed a significant difference in the 
pattern of eye movements in trials preceded by incongruent and congruent Stroop 
trials, suggesting that cognitive control is recruited during scalar inferencing. 





trials when cognitive control was engaged versus when it was not engaged. This 
suggests that the pragmatic inference was speeded by the engagement of cognitive 
control.  
Importantly, a Target preference emerged in “all” trials, regardless of prior 
Stroop type, in the 200ms time window. This provides a baseline for the earliest 
Target preference can be observed when only the semantic meaning of a word must 
be retrieved. Therefore, there was still a 300ms delay before the pragmatic 
interpretation was adopted in “some” trials preceded by incongruent Stroop trials. 
This finding is consistent with an account of scalar inferencing where the semantic 
meaning of “some” is computed prior to the generation of the pragmatic inference 
(Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011). Thus, it may be the case that while only the 
semantic meaning of “some” is accessed initially, the pragmatic meaning of “some” 
is available as early as 300ms later. The results suggest that cognitive control is 
engaged to facilitate the adoption of the pragmatic inference, possibly by inhibiting 






5.1 Summary of empirical findings 
Incremental processing is a key feature of language comprehension. This 
dissertation investigated the extent to which incrementality extends to the encoding of 
sentence interpretations in memory. In Chapter 2, I described a word-learning and 
recall experiment where participants had to calculate a scalar inference in order to 
learn the meaning of a novel word. Later, they were asked to recall the novel word’s 
meaning. The eye-tracking data showed that participants were considering the 
semantic meaning of “some” prior to making the pragmatic inference. The recall data 
showed that participants were less likely to remember the meaning of a novel word if 
it had been learned via pragmatic inference. This suggests that the semantic meaning 
of “some” was encoded in memory prior to the inference being made, and that it 
interfered with recall of the novel word. 
In Chapter 3, I described a follow-up experiment that replicated the 
experiment in Chapter 2 but without the inferencing aspect. Stimuli were presented in 
downward-entailing contexts to block the pragmatic inference from being drawn. The 
results showed that when the same amount of attention was paid to the Distractor 
object but there was no scalar inference, recall of the Target object was similar across 
conditions. This suggests that visual attention to the Distractor is not enough to 
interfere with recall. Thus, the lower proportion of matches in the “some” condition 





during the word-learning task in the “some” condition compared to the 
“all/two/three” conditions. 
Chapter 4 looked for evidence of conflict between the semantic and pragmatic 
meanings of “some” prior to the inference being adopted. Listeners completed a 
conflict adaptation task composed of interleaved Stroop and word-learning trials. 
Because cognitive control is recruited when there is competition between 
representations, incongruent Stroop trials that engage cognitive control may facilitate 
processing of following word-learning trials if there is conflict. The results showed an 
increase in Target fixations during word-learning trials featuring “some” that were 
preceded by incongruent Stroop trials, suggesting that the engagement of cognitive 
control led to stronger consideration of the pragmatic interpretation of “some”. 
Specifically, a preference for the Target, indicating the adoption of the pragmatic 
interpretation, emerged 300ms earlier in “some” trials when cognitive control was 
engaged. This suggests that cognitive control engagement actually speeded the 
pragmatic inference. However, Target preference in incongruent-“some” trials was 
still delayed relative to “all” trials preceded by either Stroop trial type, suggesting that 
there is additional processing following access of the semantic meaning of “some” 
before the pragmatic inference is adopted.  
 In the remainder of this discussion, I will examine how the project’s findings 
pertain to models of sentence processing. Next, I look at the implications for theories 
of the relationship between semantic and pragmatic processing. Then I discuss 






5.2 Implications for models of sentence processing 
The findings of Experiments 1-3 were predicted by the model of interpretation 
building outlined in Chapter 1. This model had two characteristics that were either 
different than or not clearly defined by previous models: (1) Incremental memory 
encoding means multiple interpretations of a single sentence can be committed to 
memory; (2) interpretations based on semantic/pragmatic analysis (in addition to 
syntactic analysis) persist in memory. First, in contrast to traditional accounts that 
assume that comprehension results in a single interpretation carried forward in 
memory, the model described an incremental memory system that could encode 
multiple interpretations of a sentence in memory. In two-stage and constraint-based 
accounts, reanalysis completely overrides initial misinterpretations, leading to a 
single interpretation as the output of comprehension. However, in the incremental 
memory model, initial interpretations are encoded before competition between lower-
level representations is resolved, and prior to the selection of a final interpretation. 
When more than one interpretation is considered, as in the case of scalar inferences, 
both are encoded. Experiment 1 found evidence of interference from the semantic 
meaning of “some” in the memory of an utterance where a scalar inference was 
drawn. Experiment 2 found no evidence of interference when participants recalled an 
interpretation where a scalar inference was not drawn. This suggests that multiple 





 This finding is consistent with prior work showing evidence that 
interpretations based on syntactic analyses are maintained even after reanalysis, and 
extends it to the semantic-pragmatic level of linguistic processing. This is important 
because traditional language processing models tend to focus on syntactic analysis as 
the primary means of interpretation building. In two-stage models, semantic and 
pragmatic processing only begin after syntactic analysis is complete and a single 
syntactic representation is chosen. In constraint-based models, sentence meanings are 
built on syntactic frames, and semantic and pragmatic information can inform 
structure building, but they cannot override syntactic analysis. However, syntax does 
not seem to have such a privileged role in interpretation building because 
interpretation can sometimes be inconsistent with syntactic forms. For example, 
sentences that follow non-canonical word order like passives are often misinterpreted, 
especially when they express implausible meanings (e.g., The dog was bitten by the 
man) (Ferreira, 2003). Also, the language processing system seems to have a 
mechanism for arriving at sensible interpretations based on disfluencies that make the 
input ungrammatical (Bailey, 2004; Ferreira et al., 2004). These observations suggest 
that interpretations were assigned in these cases before syntactic analysis was 
completed.  
Rather than maintain multiple interpretations in a temporary memory store 
(such as working memory), the evidence suggests that they are committed to longer-
term memory, since these memory traces can be accessed to answer comprehension 





after a sentence has been completed (Christianson et al., 2001; Christianson et al., 
2006; Ferreira et al., 2001; Patson et al., 2009; Christianson, 2008; Slattery et al., 
2013; Malyutina & den Ouden, 2016, Experiment 1). Thus, within the memory 
encoding account, final interpretations are considered “encoded” when they are 
committed to a long-term/non-temporary memory store. Prior research suggests that 
the longer the distance between the generation of an initial interpretation and a 
disambiguating cue, the more difficult it is to adopt the revised interpretation 
(Ferreira & Henderson, 1991). This suggests that the longer an interpretation is 
considered, the more likely it is to get entrenched in memory. This is supported by the 
results of Experiment 1 linking proportions of Distractor looks to recall performance. 
If a new interpretation is generated, it will not replace the initial interpretation 
because it has already been shifted from working memory into a longer-term store. 
This would result in multiple interpretations of the sentence being carried forward. 
Future research could investigate factors that may cue encoding, such as the time 
spent considering a single interpretation, or key pieces of linguistic material like main 
verbs (Parker & Phillips, 2014). 
As noted in the Introduction, recent theories of memory in language 
comprehension draw a distinction between limited capacity buffers that retrieve 
representations from declarative memory, which can include short- and long-term 
memory (e.g., Lewis & Vasishth, 2005). Encountering a word triggers the retrieval of 
an associated bundle of features into the focus of attention (e.g., the lexical 





buffers, the new word is integrated with previously retrieved feature bundles. Out of 
the focus of attention, the final interpretation would be represented in declarative 
memory by a collection of related feature bundles that has an associated level of 
activation based on prior usage and decay over time. Later, these feature bundles can 
be retrieved, but there is a chance that a related item will interfere with this retrieval 
at the point of recall. 
  The proposed model of processing is may be consistent with this activation-
based framework of memory recall. For example, encountering the word “raced” may 
trigger the retrieval of both a transitive structure and a reduced relative clause 
structure from declarative memory and into the focus of attention. Under the focus of 
attention, both structures would be combined with previously retrieved 
representations (e.g., “horse”) to form higher-level representations. Out of the focus 
of attention, some features activated by the competing representations would overlap 
(e.g., “horse”) but an association would extend from these features to both syntactic 
structures. A feature of the interpretation could be retrieved from declarative memory 
later on, with the chance that the wrong syntactic structure is reactivated. 
 However, this memory model of language processing is inconsistent with the 
results of Experiments 1 and 3 showing a delay in adoption of the pragmatic 
inference, even when cognitive control is engaged. In the activation-based 
framework, bundles of features have an assigned activation level based on prior use. 
Because the pragmatic interpretation of “some” is preferred in upward entailing 





2009; Van Tiel, Van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts, 2016), this interpretation 
(represented by a bundle of features) should have a higher baseline activation level. 
This would lead to faster retrieval of this meaning of “some” compared to the 
semantic meaning of “some”. However, in Experiment 3 there was a 500ms delay in 
Target preference in “some” trials compared to “all” trials when no cognitive control 
was engaged and a 300ms delay when cognitive control was engaged.   
 
5.3 Implications for models of scalar inference processing 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a source of debate within experimental pragmatics 
is whether scalar inferences are generated automatically or after a period of semantic 
analysis. The present results are incompatible with a Default model of scalar 
inference processing. Replicating prior research using a visual-world paradigm 
(Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011, in press), eye-tracking results from Experiment 1 
suggest that listeners considered the semantic meaning of “some” prior to making the 
scalar inference. Adding to this data, the recall task revealed evidence that the 
semantic meaning was encoded in memory. For this to be the case, that meaning had 
to be accessed before the pragmatic inference was adopted. This could not be the case 
if the interference was generated by default. 
The results are also incompatible with the hypothesis that both the semantic 
and pragmatic meanings of “some” are activated initially. The constraint-based 





the sentence means it is more likely that the inference will be made. If there is less 
support, listeners will take longer to arrive at the inference (Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2015). However, the evidence presented here suggests that there was a delay after the 
onset of “some” and prior to the inference being adopted. Under the constraint-based 
view, this delay could be due to (1) late arriving information or (2) time taken to 
compare the pragmatic meaning to other alternatives. However, there was no new 
information introduced during this time, linguistic or contextual. Moreover, even 
when cognitive control was engaged, there was a 300ms delay in Target preference 
when an inference was made (“some” trials) compared to when it was not (“all” 
trials).  
 Taken together, these findings are more in line with an account of scalar 
inference processing where the semantic meaning of “some” is computed prior to the 
generation of the pragmatic inference (Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011). Huang and 
Snedeker (in press) suggest that there are two routes to inference processing 
depending on the predictability of set descriptions. Recall that one explanation for the 
delay in inference generation observed by Huang and Snedeker (2009, 2011) was that 
more felicitous set descriptors were available (number terms) (Degen & Tanenhaus, 
2015). Huang and Snedeker (in press) varied the proportion of scalar versus number 
labels in their visual world paradigm and found that the timing of the scalar inference 
was influenced by how the set quantities were referenced throughout the study. When 
participants heard both scalar and number terms, “some” was interpreted slower than 





“all” were interpreted just as quickly. Moreover, “some” and “two” were judged to be 
sensible descriptions of subsets when there was a rich discourse (an introduction 
story) preceding the instructions. Contrary to Huang and Snedeker (2009, 2011), the 
present experiments did not include a preceding story. According to Huang and 
Snedeker (in press), listeners rely on bottom-up activation of the lexical entry for 
“some” when set descriptions are unpredictable. Based on their findings, set 
descriptions in the current experiments were relatively unpredictable because not only 
were scalar and number terms used to describe sets, but there was no story adding to 
the discourse context. Thus, the delay associated with processing “some” may be due 
to this set label unpredictability. In contrast, Huang and Snedeker predict that when 
set descriptions are predictable, listeners can encode referents using scalar terms even 
before they hear the instructions. Thus, in prior work showing rapid pragmatic 
inferencing (Grodner et al., 2010; Breheny et al., 2013; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015), 
pre-encoded descriptions were quickly mapped onto the incoming input, leading to 
rapid pragmatic interpretations. This suggests that, given more predictable set 
descriptions, the present set of experiments may have observed faster inferencing. It 
would be interesting to replicate these experiments under those conditions to see 
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